October 28, 2014 / by admin / American History / No Comments

Shadow Warfare: The History of America's Undeclared Wars

Shadow Warfare: The History of America's Undeclared Wars

Larry Hancock, Stuart Wexler

Language: English

Pages: 368

ISBN: 1619022443

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


Contrary to its contemporary image, deniable covert operations are not something new. Such activities have been ordered by every president and every administration since the Second World War. In many instances covert operations have relied on surrogates, with American personnel involved only at a distance, insulated by layers of deniability.

Shadow Warfare traces the evolution of these covert operations, detailing the tactics and tools used from the Truman era through those of the contemporary Obama Administrations. It also explores the personalities and careers of many of the most noted shadow warriors of the past sixty years, tracing the decade-long relationship between the CIA and the military.

Shadow Warfare presents a balanced, non-polemic exploration of American secret warfare, detailing its patterns, consequences and collateral damage and presenting its successes as well as failures. Shadow Wars explores why every president from Franklin Roosevelt on, felt compelled to turn to secret, deniable military action. It also delves into the political dynamic of the president’s relationship with Congress and the fact that despite decades of combat, the U.S. Congress has chosen not to exercise its responsibility to declare a single state of war - even for extended and highly visible combat.

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FitzGerald. One document, from July 26, 1963, indicates that the SAS chief was copied on TILT information, but only after the fact; the copy includes a full background review on how the project came about and all reference documents are dated post-mission.372 That lack of administration approval is especially striking given the level of Robert Kennedy’s involvement in Cuban operations, the firing of former Mongoose Project CIA team leader William Harvey for authorizing boat missions into Cuba

proprietary companies and logistics. CIA Director Casey had already begun to pursue options for him to deal with both issues, including going outside the U.S. for weapons and financial support. Early on in the Contra campaign against Nicaragua, Casey had arranged for the donation of considerable quantities of deniable Soviet weapons from the Israelis. North described how Casey organized Operation Tipped Kettle, using the Pentagon to coordinate the transport of hundreds of tons of Israeli-captured

counterterror activities. A special bin Laden counterterrorism unit was established and focused on developing an operational picture of his network. And Clinton authorized broad-based covert action against both bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. That authorization included something quite dramatic, something not seen since the Eisenhower Administration and the instruction to eliminate Patrice Lumumba. Clinton had not just directed another covert operation but had effectively given the CIA the authority to

Smathers, George, 86–87 Smith, Horace, 137, 138 Smith, Walter Bedell, 9, 15, 72, 81 Smith, William French, 397 Somalia, 436, 450, 523, 528–533, 539 Somoza, Francisco, 328 Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 329 Somoza García, Anastasio, 81, 82, 85, 94–95, 206, 207, 242, 327–330 Soong May-Ling (Madame Chiang), 56 South Africa, 218, 267, 273, 274, 276–279, 538 Southeast Asia, 24, 41, 43, 59, 91, 99 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 257 Southern Air Transport, 239, 366–367, 376 Southern

rebel groups were actually located. The CIA was going to have to go hunting for the insurgency. And what it was going to need first was a local base of operations and an air corridor that would lead from American bases in the Pacific, from Okinawa and Clark Field in the Philippines, across Southeast Asia, and ultimately to a working staging area adjacent to Tibet. As of 1956, that need was certainly not going to be met by India, which was the perfect location across the hump of the Tibetan

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